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Syria represents the epitome of a modern authoritarian-praetorian state.2 Key army units 
buttress the rule of President Hafiz al-Asad3 but it is the intelligence services, or 
mukhabarat, that are the "keystone" in Asad's "political arch."4 In addition to their crucial 
role in buttressing Asad's authoritarian rule, the intelligence services have played major 
roles in Syria's foreign affairs. Their involvement in terrorism is most well-known, but 
they have also become, notably in Lebanon, leading arbiters of foreign policy in their 
own rights.5  
Notwithstanding their importance for domestic and regional affairs, Syria's intelligence 
services remain understudied. Although studies of Syrian politics often refer to the 
intelligence services, there have been few systematic attempts to study their development 
and role.6 This article is an attempt to fill that gap by outlining the origins and 
development of the Syrian services as well as providing insight into their use of covert 
action and terrorism.  
Studying Intelligence and Political Violence  
This study aims to make contributions to the separate but related fields of intelligence 
studies and authoritarian politics. The academic study of intelligence has taken off in the 
West over the past decade and a half, with the majority of research focusing on Western 
services, primarily British and American. Significant work has also been done on other 
Western services, such as Canada and Australia, while studies of the former Soviet 
Union's intelligence apparatus have also appeared in growing numbers.  
A limited amount of work has been done on intelligence in other parts of the world but 
comparative intelligence studies is still lacking in breadth. Studies on Chinese services 
have now begun to emerge and Israel has been well covered, if often in a rather 
unacademic fashion.7 Aside from these areas, though, intelligence studies has virtually 
passed by the developing world.8 This lacuna is nowhere more glaring than in relation to 
the Arab world.9 The Arab states have often only entered into intelligence studies in two 
ways. First, they have been examined as victims of Western covert action in studies of 
the activities of Western intelligence services in the Third World.10 Second, they have 
been portrayed as perpetrators of "state-sponsored terrorism."11 These approaches, while 
touching on important topics, do not give comprehensive accounts of the evolution and 
roles of national services. Such accounts are necessary if comparative intelligence studies 
is to broaden its scope.  
The need to study intelligence in the Arab world is especially pressing since these 
institutions are of the utmost domestic political importance in a large number of the Arab 
states. The emergence of the authoritarian, or more particularly the praetorian, state in the 
Arab world12 has been a topic of some interest to political scientists for a number of 
years.13 Nonetheless, as a recent review of the literature argued, "state violence has 
received . . . (limited) systematic attention in recent scholarship."14  
In domestic politics many modern Arab states have become virtual "security states."15 
The intelligence and security services have been elevated to a leading role in the state. 
Rather than serving the central government, as is the norm in Western states, they have 
come to share power at the highest levels. The development of these "bureaucracies of 
repression" is a topic that needs further study.16 While other "security states," most 
notoriously the Latin American "National Security States," have moved to rein in their 
internal security apparatuses, it appears that in the Arab world the tendency is toward a 
strengthening of the means of repression.17 As current events in Algeria, Egypt, Palestine, 
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain suggest, the growing internal threat to many of these states is 
likely to lead to an increased role for their repressive apparatuses.18  
The problem faced by researchers in all branches of intelligence studies is the dearth of 
verifiable information. Nonetheless, writers on Western services and even on the former 
Soviet Union have been able to use official archives and interviews to make significant 
progress. The problem is more acute in relation to the developing world. In the few 
countries where official archives exist they are rarely open to local researchers, let alone 
outsiders. Material in any way connected with security or intelligence, or even with 
modern politics, is usually out of bounds. Interviews can be used to a limited extent, but 
can prove even more unreliable than in the Western context.19 These problems have 
tended to deter researchers, but they need not prevent work being carried out since much 
elementary empirical work is waiting to be done. There is a need for studies of the 
history, organizational structures, operations and political and military roles of Arab 
intelligence services.  
This article uses two different approaches to indicate the sort of work that is possible on a 
relatively closed Arab state, in this case Syria. The first part provides an overview of the 
history and development of Syria's intelligence services assembled from a combination of 
secondary sources and easily available primary sources. This indicates what can be learnt 
from the interpretation of readily available sources. The second part is a study of covert 
and paramilitary action during the 1960-61 confrontation between Syria and Jordan. This 
study relies mainly on Western archival and regional press sources. It demonstrates what 
can be learned about the normally subterranean workings of Arab intelligence services by 
analysis of the occasional high visibility events.  
SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW  
As a consequence of the French Mandate that created the modern Syrian state, the 
country's intelligence services owe much to the French "template" which shaped their 
early development. The influence of the French model is most striking in the long-
standing primacy of military intelligence, known until 1969 as the Deuxième Bureau. 
Although both Egypt and the former Soviet Union, along with the East Bloc satellite 
states, had at times intimate ties with the Syrian intelligence apparatus, they had only 
limited impact on its structures and organizational development.  
Syria's intelligence services were established by the French Mandatory authority. Before 
independence in 1945, external intelligence matters were handled by the services of 
Metropolitan France. The French-officered services in Syria were only responsible for 
internal security and counter-espionage.20 After independence the mission of these 
services gradually expanded to include targeting exile and opposition groups in Lebanon, 
and intelligence gathering efforts against Israel. Lebanon was the scene of numerous 
operations against political exiles and opponents.21 The Israel section ran spy rings and 
fedayeen paramilitary/terrorist operations in northern Israel from bases in Qunaytra and 
south Lebanon.  
Institutionally, the dominant role of the Army in politics was reflected in the rise of the 
Deuxième Bureau, the intelligence branch of the Army General Staff, at the expense of 
the civilian Department of General Security (Sûreté Générale).22 The tenure of 'Abd al-
Hamid Sarraj as head of the Deuxième Bureau, which lasted from 1955 to 1958, 
exemplified these trends. His officers became increasingly active in both Lebanon and 
northern Israel. At the same time as directing these activities, Sarraj built up both his own 
power and that of the Deuxième Bureau at home. The Sûreté became no more than an 
executive arm of the Deuxième Bureau.  
During this period, Sarraj and the Deuxième Bureau pursued a generally anti-imperialist 
foreign policy. This was marked by support for Egyptian President Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser 
and opposition to the USA and Lebanese President Camille Chamoun's pro-Western 
government in Lebanon. However, this policy was more radical than that favored by 
President Shukri al-Quwatli in Damascus. As a result, the President and Chief of Staff, 
Tawfiq Nizam al-Din, attempted in March 1957 to relieve Sarraj of his duties. They were 
unable to do so.23 Even at this early stage the military branch of Syrian intelligence 
displayed a high degree of independence in both the formulation and execution of policy. 
However, it was only one intelligence actor in Syria, not yet the dominant one.24  
In February 1958, the Syrian government merged with Egypt to form the United Arab 
Republic (UAR). The union lasted until September 1961. During the union, Syrian 
intelligence services came under the overall authority of the Egyptian Directorate of 
General Intelligence. The Deuxième Bureau was subordinated to Egypt's Directorate of 
Military Intelligence, while a new Special Bureau was set up under the Interior Ministry 
and became the prime intelligence service. Like the rest of the Syrian military and 
government, they were kept under tight control by Nasser's proconsul Marshal Amer, 
who was ordered by Nasser to subordinate Syria to Egyptian rule.25 At the same time, 
however, Syrian intelligence activities were expanded and the intelligence services were 
instrumental in supporting Nasser's foreign policies. During the 1958 Lebanese Civil 
War, the Deuxième Bureau assisted the opposition National Front.26 Lebanese nationals, 
fedayeen units and undercover Syrian soldiers were all used in covert operations against 
the Lebanese government's gendarmes and militia.27  
After its secession from the UAR, the new Syrian government under President Qudsi had 
to defend itself against Egyptian intelligence, which was seeking to subvert it.28 The 
Deuxième Bureau and a reformed civilian intelligence, renamed the Internal Security 
Forces Command (ISFC), concentrated their activities in Lebanon. Their targets were the 
Lebanese government, Syrian exiles and Egyptian agents. Their methods continued to 
consist of psychological operations, such as leafleting campaigns, and assassination.29  
With the Ba'th coup in March 1963, the security services adapted to the new political 
regime. New directors were installed, but the intelligence services remained as faction 
ridden as the military. The new leaders concentrated on recruiting and promoting men 
loyal to themselves.30 This period saw a further strengthening of the domestic position of 
the agencies and the dominance of the military. In 1963, a State of Emergency law was 
passed, giving them an even freer hand in rooting out opponents. On 24 March 1965, 
Decree no. 67 put the ISFC into a military framework, thus ending even the facade of 
civilian control. The central importance to the regime of a disciplined and ruthless 
intelligence and security apparatus was brought home to the new rulers by the April 1964 
uprisings in Hama led by the Muslim Brotherhood and backed by Egypt. The government 
was able to control the opposition only by bringing in armored units and shelling part of 
the town.31  
On the external front, intelligence gathering against Israel continued,32 but the main 
targets of covert operations remained Lebanon and pro-Nasserite forces. In May 1964, at 
the time of the Lebanese parliamentary elections, a Syrian ISFC officer was arrested in 
Beirut, charged with leading a group whose tasks included attacking the Egyptian 
Embassy, kidnapping Syrian exiles, and assassinating pro-Egyptian Lebanese.33  
It was also at this time that Yasser Arafat's Palestinian guerrilla group Fatah assumed a 
heightened role. In the early days this group was a tool of the Deuxième Bureau.34 The 
Bureau's Director, Colonel Ahmad Suwaidini, saw Arafat's group as fitting in with his 
strategy of popular revolutionary war against Israel. Since Fatah had no men of its own at 
this stage, they were given the opportunity to employ members of the fedayeen unit 
created in the 1950s.35 The intimate relationship between Fatah and the Deuxième 
Bureau is indicated by the fact that Fatah's first successful attack on 31 December 1964, 
was carried out against the Israeli National Water Carrier, an installation that had long 
been the target of Syrian diplomatic protests and military attacks.36 The only restriction 
on their activities was that attacks had to be launched from Lebanon and Jordan, rather 
than directly from Syrian territory. Although Israel did retaliate against Syrian targets,37 
most Israeli reprisals were instead conducted against alleged guerrilla bases in Lebanon 
and Jordan.  
After the February 1966 coup within the Ba'th Party, Salah Jadid emerged as the leader of 
Syria's most radical regime to date. Eager to establish his extremist credentials and to hit 
back at his many enemies, Jadid centralized control of all intelligence and security 
services under Colonel 'Abd al-Karim al-Jundi.38 His support for Jadid was so crucial that 
when Jundi died in March 1969, it was only a matter of time before Jadid fell.  
From 1966 to 1969, Jundi further expanded the role and power of his agencies, both at 
home and abroad. It was during this period that their reputation for brutal ruthlessness 
was firmly established.39 The use of Palestinian guerrillas against Israel was intensified in 
an attempt to emulate the successes of the Algerian FLN and the Viet Cong, and to make 
up for Syria's humiliating military inferiority. Syrian-Jordanian relations were marked by 
incidents such as that of 21 May 1967, when a car bomb was detonated at the Ramtha 
border post, killing 21 Jordanians.40  
In November 1970, Hafiz al-Asad ousted Jadid in what he labelled a 'Corrective Coup.' 
The Asad regime has proved to be Syria's most stable and durable since independence 
and has toned down the previous radicalism. Under Asad there has been a remarkable 
continuity among the senior personnel in the intelligence community.41 This contrasts 
with the turbulence of the two preceding decades reflects both the stability of his regime 
and the extent to which the commanders of the main intelligence organs are linked to 
Asad by personal and family ties. Asad's regime is very much a minority clique. The top 
leadership are drawn largely from Asad's extended family and the Alawite community. 
Its main props have been the intelligence agencies, paramilitary units and certain military 
commands.42  
In the 1970s, the intelligence agencies were very active abroad and were heavily involved 
in guerrilla and terrorist operations, especially those carried out by proxy groups.43 The 
foci of this activity were fedayeen operations in the Golan and northern Israel. 
Additionally, sabotage, assassination and terrorist operations were carried out in Europe 
and in the Arab world.44  
During the 1978-82 period, when an insurgency led by the Muslim Brotherhood rocked 
the regime, the role and power of the intelligence agencies expanded dramatically.45 
During this period, they gained increased resources and personnel, greater powers and 
demonstrated a brutal ruthlessness calculated to cow any potential opponent.46 Since the 
suppression of this insurgency, these organizations have found less to keep them 
occupied on the domestic security front. They have become personal fiefdoms belonging 
to their directors, disposing of tremendous resources and power. Competition between 
them is fierce and is held in check only by Asad's firm grip and the knowledge that they 
must not let their competition undermine the stability of the regime upon which they all 
depend.47  
These institutions have increasingly turned their attention to foreign policy. In Lebanon, 
Military Intelligence (MI) has emerged as the dominant institution. The use of terrorism, 
especially by MI and Air Force Intelligence, is well documented.48 To take a few 
incidents from just one year, in 1983 Jordanian embassy officials were attacked in Spain, 
Greece, Italy and India. Two were killed and five wounded. Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO) officials were attacked in Greece and Portugal, resulting in two dead 
and three wounded. Other bomb attacks in Israel, Turkey and Jordan injured twelve 
people. Such methods became the primary ones of Syrian foreign policy in this period. 
The regime was encouraged to use them by their evident success. Through the use of 
terrorism Asad was able to rid himself of political opponents, drive Israel and the US out 
of Lebanon, and bring both Jordan's King Hussein and PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat into 
line on a number of crucial occasions.  
A central theme emerges from this historical account. Since 1948, the military has been 
the arena of politics within which the struggle for power has been conducted.49 However, 
while regular army units have been used in the various coups and coup attempts, the most 
effective instruments have been the intelligence and security services. This was 
exemplified by the power struggle between Asad and Jadid. In March 1969, Rifa't Asad 
(Asad's younger brother) used his paramilitary units, in conjunction with Military 
Intelligence, to crush Jundi's security force. It was this that ultimately decided the 
struggle between Asad and Jadid.50 Control of these services has been vital for all of the 
players in recent Syrian politics. In the process of acquiring this central political role, 
these agencies have acquired tremendous power.  
The Mukhabarat State  
The term "mukhabarat state" is often used rather loosely in relation to the contemporary 
Arab world to refer to the nature of authoritarian state power in much of the region. 
Asad's Syria provides a prime example of such a state. From independence until the mid-
1960s, the intelligence services were an essential element in the struggle for power. In 
particular, control of the Deuxième Bureau was highly prized as it enabled the faction 
that controlled it to persecute its opponents with the full panoply of summary arrests and 
military tribunals.51 Under Asad, the regime has consolidated its grip on the intelligence 
services and they have come to dominate all other political and military institutions, 
including the state itself. They now play a leading role in both the making and execution 
of Syrian domestic and foreign policy.  
In order to understand the workings of Syria's decision-making elite it is necessary to 
fathom the inter-relationships among the intelligence services, and to understand their 
structure and operating norms.52 Unfortunately, this sort of research is extremely hard to 
pursue in relation to any intelligence service,53 let alone with regard to Syria. The best 
that can be done for now is to sketch in outline an organizational schema of the country's 
intelligence apparatus. The exact structure is impossible to analyze precisely as personal 
relationships and loyalties matter much more than institutional divisions. These 
institutions should be viewed as extended networks of patronage, rather than formal 
bureaucratic structures.54 Published sources record that Syria has 15 separate security and 
intelligence services. The following are the most important:55  
Presidential Security Council. The Council's chairman is Asad's intelligence "supremo," 
who is responsible for supervising the other agencies and for resolving interservice 
disputes. The two men who have held this post have been Air Force officers and long-
time confidants of the president. General Naji Jamil held the post from 1971 to 1978. The 
current incumbent is Brigadier Muhammad al-Khuwali. The Council also controls small 
intelligence and security organizations of its own, such as the Foreign Liaison Office, 
which monitors the activities of foreign diplomats in Damascus.  
General Intelligence Directorate (GID). This is the current incarnation of civil 
intelligence. It was established in its present form in 1971. It controls the civil police, the 
border guards, and has primary responsibility for maintaining surveillance over the Ba'th 
Party, the civilian bureaucracy and the general populace. Adnan Babagh was its first 
director. His successor, Ali Hadani, was in office during the mid 1970s. Fu'ad Absi was 
the director in 1983. The recently dismissed Majid Sa'id took over the post in early 1987.  
Political Security Directorate (PSD). The PSD is the branch of the GID that handles 
political intelligence and security, as opposed to criminal and civil policing. In the early 
eighties it was headed by Ahmad Sa'id Salih and from 1987 until recently by Adnan Badr 
Hassan. It is divided into the Internal Security Department and the External Security 
Department (ESD). The former was headed until recently by Muhammad Nassif. The 
ESD appears to be divided into three units, Arab Affairs, Refugee Affairs and Zionist and 
Jewish Affairs.  
Military Intelligence (MI). The Deuxième Bureau that preceded MI was a powerful 
political actor. MI, established in 1969, is now probably the dominant intelligence agency 
in Syria. In Lebanon, MI under Ghazi Kanaan appears to control not only the military and 
security situation but also Syrian political policy.  
MI controls the Military Police, who provide security for elements of the ruling elite, and 
the Office of the Chief of Reconnaissance, which is probably responsible for strategic and 
tactical military intelligence collection, collation and analysis. MI's main role is to ensure 
the loyalty of the military. It is also responsible for carrying out unconventional warfare 
operations. In 1969 Colonel Ali Zaza was appointed as director but he was replaced in 
1971 by Colonel Shehabi. General Bitar took over in 1973, but was replaced the same 
year by Brigadier 'Ali Douba.  
Air Force Intelligence (AFI). This agency is the closest to Asad. Brigadier al-Khuwali 
served as its director from 1963 until 1987. He was moved from the post after court cases 
linked him to terrorist operations in Britain and West Germany. The current director, 
Colonel Ibrahim Houwaji, is al-Khuwali's nephew.  
Naji Jamil filled the dual roles of Air Force commander and Presidential Security Council 
director from 1971 until 1978. Khuwali was director of AFI. By 1977 the latter was also 
the President's Personal Assistant for Intelligence and Security, in charge of the security 
arrangements for official functions. He subsequently moved on to combine the posts of 
AFI Director and intelligence supremo. The organization's primary roles are to ensure the 
loyalty of the Air Force, to provide physical security for official functions and to carry 
out certain overseas operations.  
Special Forces (SF). Formed in the 1970s, this elite army unit has between 10,000 and 
15,000 personnel and is equipped with heavy armaments. It has seen action against both 
the Muslim Brotherhood internally and the Israelis in Lebanon.  
Presidential Guard (PG). Established in 1976, the 10,000 strong Guard is commanded by 
Adnan Makhlouf, the cousin of Asad's wife. Its role is to guard the Presidential Palace 
and central Damascus.  
Struggle Companies. This small paramilitary unit is commanded by Adnan al-Asad, the 
President's cousin.  
Other units. Virtually every prominent personality in the regime has some sort of 
personal security unit. This may consist of a handful of bodyguards, or may be an 
extensive intelligence apparatus. Most of these small units are only responsible for the 
security of their leader's personal fiefdom.  
 
Table 1 Structure of Syrian Intelligence and Security Services  
 
SYRIA AND JORDAN TERROR AND COUNTERTERROR, 1960-61  
The proclivity of Syria's intelligence services for engaging in political violence has been 
touched on in the literature,56 which deals primarily with anti-Western/Israeli operations. 
However, there is a rich vein of material on inter-Arab operations which has been mined 
inadequately. The advantage of this area of study is that paramilitary action is often the 
point at which clandestine activities become public. Therefore, by concentrating on this 
topic, researchers can learn much about the functioning of states' intelligence services 
more generally.  
Although covert action and terrorist operations are by definition hard to document, it is 
possible to use Western archives to shed some light on these affairs. The study presented 
here is an examination of the covert battle that erupted between Syrian and Jordanian 
intelligence from March 1960 to March 1961.  
Relations between the Syrian and Jordanian governments had deteriorated during the 
mid-to late 1950s as Nasserists and Ba'thists tightened their grip on power in Damascus. 
In 1957, a major crisis erupted when Jordan's King Hussein took his country decisively 
into the Western camp and crushed the Nasserist elements in his army and government. 
Syrian intelligence under Colonel 'Abd al-Hamid Sarraj did its best to support the 
opposition during the spring and summer of 1957, but their subversive efforts were 
thwarted by Jordanian security, with assistance from Britain.57  
The formation of the United Arab Republic in February 1958 posed an immediate threat 
to Jordan, since Nasser's intelligence services were now able to work through the Syrians. 
During 1958 Syrian and Egyptian agents sought to stir up the pro-Nasserist opposition in 
Jordan; they distributed subversive literature and smuggled arms into the country.58 
Syrian and Egyptian agents also carried out a series of bomb attacks. In the wake of the 
Iraqi Revolution in July 1958, however, Britain rushed troops to Jordan and the US 
increased its logistical support. As a result, King Hussein was able to counter the 
subversive threat and to bring the domestic opposition under firm control.  
During much of 1958 and in early 1959 the intelligence services of the UAR, and 
especially their Syrian elements, were kept busy controlling domestic dissent, prosecuting 
a large-scale covert war in Lebanon, and countering the activities of the revolutionary 
Iraqi regime under 'Abd al-Karim Qasim.59 Nonetheless, Sarraj had not forgotten his feud 
with the Jordanian monarchy, whom he regarded as reactionary puppets of the imperialist 
West.  
An informal truce between Syria and Jordan lasted from August 1959 to mid-1960, at 
which time Amman, encouraged by the Sa'udis, began to broadcast calls for the Syrian 
and Egyptian peoples to overthrow their ruler. In May 1960, Amman Radio criticized 
'small dictators' and 'Pharaonic rulers.'60 On 26 June, King Hussein attacked Nasser 
directly, saying:  
the world has witnessed many dictatorships, which in most cases were led by men of 
higher calibre, better quality, higher status, better character . . . and more value than His 
Excellency the President. However, all these men soon collapsed . . . [H]istory will 
dispose of . . . [him] as it disposes of every beguiled adventurer.61  
Sarraj struck back, but now that there was no longer a vibrant indigenous opposition 
movement to support he changed tactics. His agents sought to strike at the heart of the 
monarchy by targeting the King and his ministers directly.  
Already in March Jordanian security had uncovered one major assassination plot, which 
it traced to an Egyptian "covert organization" rather than to Sarraj. The conspiracy came 
to light when a Jordanian Palestinian was arrested and charged with plotting to kill Prime 
Minister Hazza Majali and the King's uncle Sharif Nasir. It emerged that the Palestinian 
had been working in Damascus when he had been pressured by exiled Jordanian Ba'thist 
'Abdallah Rimawi and exiled former Jordanian Chief of Staff Ali Abu Nuwar into 
cooperating with them. He had been given a Lebanese passport and told to return to 
Jordan, where he was to contact an ex-security officer, Captain Muhammad Mutalq. 
Mutalq handed the Palestinian a pistol, which had been smuggled into the country by two 
of Mutalq's accomplices, and briefed him on the plan to assassinate Majali and Sharif 
Nasir. In the wake of the affair, six ex-army officers were arrested and Jordan made a 
public request for the extradition of Nuwar and Rimawi from Syria. Majali also told the 
British Ambassador, Charles Johnston, that he proposed to mount a commando raid on a 
camp near Dera' which Jordanian intelligence had identified as a UAR-run paramilitary 
training base for Jordanian exiles.62  
Other abortive plots came to light in the ensuing months. In August a member of 
Hussein's personal entourage was convicted of attempting to kill the King by planting 
acid in his sinus drops. The man admitted that he had been suborned by an official of the 
UAR Embassy. Also in August a palace cook who had planned to poison the King 
confessed to having been put up to the task by Syrian intelligence.63 However, it was only 
at the end of the month that Sarraj's efforts bore fruit.  
On 29 August a bomb exploded in a drawer of Majali's desk in his office. Only weeks 
before, Majali had lambasted Nasser as "a feverish and spiteful man who does not realize 
what he says."64 The results of the explosion were described by Johnston: his "left leg 
was burnt . . . his right foot and both hands were blown off. His throat was cut as if by a 
knife, presumably by splinters from the sheet of glass on the top of his desk. On his face 
was an expression of the most complete astonishment."65 The Foreign Ministry 
Undersecretary was also killed in the explosion. Twenty minutes later a second bomb 
went off in a room on the ground floor of the building. In all, the two bombs killed 12 
and wounded 41.66  
The attack, which was "clearly planned with expert advice," had been organized by 
Burhan Adham, one of Sarraj's most trusted assistants and another Syrian intelligence 
officer, Bahjat Massouti.67 Their main co-conspirators were two Jordanian exiles, Salah 
Shira and Zakaria al-Tahir. Shira was the brother of the former Chief of Staff Sadiq 
Shira, who had been imprisoned in early 1959 for his part in a coup attempt.68 Tahir had 
been working with Syrian intelligence since mid-1958 and had organized the smuggling 
of the weapon intended for use in the March plot. He had recruited one of those involved 
in the bombing, Salah al-Safadi, in 1959 and had paid him 1,500 Syrian pounds a month 
to carry out black propaganda activities in Jordan. Tahir subsequently offered Safadi 
10,000 Jordanian dinars for his part in the Majali operation. Although Syrian intelligence 
usually smuggled explosives into Jordan in trucks transiting between Syria and the Gulf, 
in this case the device was delivered by an unwitting taxi driver. Safadi collected the 
suitcase, packed with 30 kilograms of explosives, and handed it to two messengers in the 
prime minister's office who had been recruited. Apparently Majali had been advised to 
dismiss these two shortly before the attack, as they were under suspicion, but he had 
refused to do so. On the night of the 28th the messengers placed one bomb in the prime 
minister's office and another in their room near the entrance to the building, after which 
they left immediately for Syria. They were safely across the border before dawn.69  
The UAR, unsurprisingly, refused Jordan's request to extradite the Jordanian suspects or 
hand over Adham or Massouti. Instead, Egypt's Voice of the Arabs radio station lauded 
the assassins proclaiming that "the peoples . . . [have] move[d] to strike and break their 
shackles and take revenge against the traitors."70 The UAR propaganda campaign that 
ensued sought to depict the attack as the work of a Jordanian opposition movement, 
rebelling against the "oppressive" monarchy. Words were backed by deeds. On 1 
September the British Embassy in Cairo flashed an urgent message to London reporting 
an informant's information that four UAR diplomatic bags stuffed with explosives had 
just been despatched to Amman for use against the King, the new prime minister and the 
British Embassy.71 It was discovered subsequently that officials of the UAR Embassy had 
suborned the King's valet to place bombs in the royal country residence and also had laid 
plans to blow up Amman radio station.72  
Although most of these plots were foiled by the Jordanian security services, the very real 
danger of the UAR's strategy was seen by the British Ambassador: "[Nasser] still has 
plenty of supporters here . . . and if he succeeds in time in blowing up the leaders of the 
present régime, and thus intimidating their supporters, we must be prepared for the 
country to drop into his lap." King Hussein, however, was not waiting for "the Jordanian 
leaders . . . [to] sit quietly by until they were all blown up."73 Encouraged by Chief of 
Staff Habas Majali and other advisers who had long been spoiling for a fight with the 
UAR, he immediately mobilized his army for an attack on Syria.74  
By the 9th of September Hussein was "almost ready for desperate action." He was 
"preparing to intervene in Syria in support of disturbances engineered by . . . [Jordanian] 
agents."75 The next day Johnston saw the King and persuaded him not to take immediate 
action.76 Nonetheless, by the 12th Jordan was "ready for a military move against Syria." 
Tank, armored car and motorized infantry regiments were concentrated at Mafraq, the 
Royal Guards Brigade and an artillery regiment near Qasr Hallabat in the desert and 
further artillery and infantry units positioned near Ramtha. Royal Jordanian Air Force 
(RJAF) aircraft had been dispersed, briefed for attacks on Syrian Air Force bases and 
placed at two hours readiness for take-off. Chief of Staff Majali told the British that 
Jordan's attack would commence if the attempts of a UN mediator to ensure extradition 
of the conspirators did not succeed.77  
The British had meanwhile been doing their best to restrain the Jordanians. Judging that 
any "disturbances in Syria are likely to be extremely amateurish in execution," and that 
the RJAF could not match the UAR's Air Force, the British concluded that "Jordan would 
have no hope of avoiding ultimate defeat" and may be "heading for a fiasco." Johnston 
sought to convince Hussein that UAR propaganda and terrorism were designed to make 
him lose his nerve and do something rash. Eventually, the British warnings undermined 
Jordanian resolution and the military situation de-escalated.78 Nonetheless, Hussein and 
his advisers were not willing to let Nasser and Sarraj get away with their provocation. 
Jordan sought to pay them back in their own medicine.  
Colonel Ghazi al-Khatib, the Jordanian Military Attaché in Beirut, was to be the 
operations officer for a covert campaign probably coordinated by the King's uncle, Sharif 
Nasir.79 Khatib took up contact with Salah Shishakli, who was active in anti-UAR 
intrigue and who had brought together other Syrian exiles including Hisham Barazi.80 
Khatib arranged to supply Shishakli with money and arms to hit back at the Syrian 
regime. A Lebanese communist and ex-minister, Muhammad al-Fadl, was the group's 
Lebanese patron. Some Syrian exiles were trained in Jordan in a "Camp Shishakli," 
which the Syrian press dubbed a school for "terrorism, sabotage and murder."81 Other 
Syrians were recruited in Lebanon and offered money in return for placing bombs in 
Damascus. By September the group's 300-odd agents were ready for action. On 10 
September the UAR Consulate in Beirut was bombed. Subsequently, several newspapers 
in Beirut were also hit.  
On 25 October bombs went off in central Damascus outside the Hijaz railway station, the 
post and telegraph office and the old municipality building. These explosions were timed 
to coincide with visits by Nasser and the Afghan King to Damascus and so cause 
maximum embarrassment to the UAR. In another incident Syrian security officers 
apprehended two truck-loads of explosives at the Jordan border which, it appeared, had 
been intended for detonation among the Damascene crowds during a rally to welcome 
Nasser. Two men were subsequently apprehended and admitted they had been promised 
1,000 dinars and appointments as sergeants in the Jordanian Army if they agreed to let off 
bombs in Suwayda' during Nasser's visit. On 9 November a large explosive device was 
discovered and disarmed on the Damascus-Beirut railway line. In mid-November a 
Lebanese was arrested in Damascus while planting explosives. Later in the month a 
Jordanian agent on a mission to organize terrorist attacks was also apprehended.  
Damascus charged Lebanon with harboring these subversives. Lebanon responded to 
Syrian complaints and cracked down on the group. Salah Shishakli's house was raided. 
Although Shishakli got away, an ex-Syrian officer, Muhammad Munir Armanazi, was 
arrested and a cache of weapons and false identification documents was found. Warrants 
were issued for the arrest of Shishakli, Barazi and their accomplices. On 21 November 
Khatib was expelled from Lebanon. He returned to Amman, where he was rewarded by 
being appointed aide-de-camp to the King. Meanwhile, Fadl and the other Lebanese 
members of the group were put on trial.  
Radio Amman and the Syrian press traded accusations during December and January. 
Amman alleged that there had been a Syrian plot to poison Irbid's water supplies and, 
more plausibly, that Syrian agents had paid a Jordanian 600 Syrian pounds to plant 
bombs near the Royal Palace and the Finance Ministry in Amman. Amman also reported 
that a Jordanian civil servant blew up himself and his two sons while preparing Syrian-
supplied explosives at his home in Mafraq. The Syrian press countered Radio Amman's 
charges with accusations that Jordanian agents had let off bombs in the vicinity of Dera'. 
Demonstrations were also organized in Damascus to protest the executions of four of the 
Jordanians convicted of involvement in the Majali assassination.82  
In mid-January Jordanian agents struck again, this time seeking to provoke a row 
between Beirut and Damascus and so disrupt their effective cooperation against 
Jordanian covert operations. Plans were made to plant a bomb on an aircraft flying into 
Damascus airport, but this proved too difficult, so time bombs were planted in taxis 
travelling from Beirut to Damascus. Jordanian agents reserved seats in three taxis, slipped 
the bombs behind the seats and then left before the taxis departed. On 13 January one 
bomb went off prematurely as the taxi was entering Damascus, injuring two passengers. 
At 3:00 am the following morning the other two bombs went off, destroying both cars, 
one of which was in Damascus and the other in Homs. The Lebanese police acted swiftly 
and arrested seven suspects.83  
Later in the month clashes occurred as both sides sought to infiltrate paramilitary bands 
into each other's territory. On 25 January a Syrian patrol engaged in a firefight with 
Jordanian saboteurs attempting to mine the railway line close to the Jordanian border. 
Three of the infiltrators were captured. A few days later Jordanian infiltrators detonated 
explosives near the Syrian customs post on the Dera'-Amman road.84  
Eventually, in February 1961, Hussein wrote to Nasser suggesting that they call a truce in 
their covert war. Despite this approach, the UAR continued to publicize alleged plots by 
Jordanian intelligence. One agent, for instance, was supposedly paid 40 dinars for each 
bomb he planted in Damascus government buildings. Hussein assured the British that 
these latest charges were trumped-up, but it is possible they related to operations that had 
been initiated by Jordanian intelligence before Hussein's call for a truce.85 Whatever the 
case, in March Nasser responded positively to the truce proposal and the mutual attacks 
were halted.86  
This was not, of course, the end of the secret war between the Jordanian and Syrian 
intelligence services. Violence was to re-erupt often in the following decades, especially 
after 1970, when Asad sought to keep Jordan in the anti-Israeli camp.87 Nonetheless, this 
brief account of an especially bitter episode in the struggle brings out a number of 
characteristics of Syrian covert operations. First, it highlights the use of terrorism as part 
of a coordinated political warfare strategy that sought to make it appear as if the violence 
was home-grown and that King Hussein faced widespread domestic discontent. Second, 
when this strategy lost credibility, Syria continued to employ indigenous proxies, such as 
Rimawi and Mutalq. This approach presaged the use of deniable Palestinian proxies from 
the late-1960s on. Third, Syria used terrorism to provoke an escalatory Jordanian 
counterattack that could have provided an excuse for a crushing conventional military 
blow. Lastly, it is clear that Jordan responded to Syrian terrorism in kind. Despite the 
tendency in the West to associate state-sponsored terrorism with "radical" regimes, such 
as Syria, in the turbulent Middle East even King Hussein has not hesitated to use the tool, 
his "respectable" image in the West notwithstanding.  
CONCLUSIONS  
The first aim of this article has been to present aspects of the development and history of 
Syria's intelligence services not before discussed in the open literature. This adds to the 
limited amount of published work on other developing country services and those in the 
Arab world in particular. This article demonstrates that a combination of secondary 
literature on a country's politics, press reports, material from human rights groups, 
government documentation and interviews can be used to sketch the history, 
development, structure and political roles of intelligence services even in an authoritarian 
state such as Syria.88  
A lack of open primary sources makes it difficult for researchers to do more in-depth 
work on this topic. While a limited amount of research can be done by more extensive 
use of US government material obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, it is only 
the Syrian archives themselves that will provide a fuller picture of the country's 
intelligence services. These are unlikely to emerge unless there is a breakdown in the 
state's authority as happened in Iraq in 1991, after which some four million documents 
belonging to the Iraqi security services were removed to the safekeeping of the US 
Congress and Middle East Watch.89  
The second aim of this article has been to provide a detailed narrative of the use of covert 
and paramilitary action by Syria and Jordan during one of the numerous periods of 
tension that have marked the two countries' relationship. Studying this episode provides 
insights into the workings of the Syrian intelligence services and their operational 
practices, which otherwise would be unavailable. This narrative has demonstrated that it 
is possible to use Western archives and press sources to study such episodes.  
As noted in the introduction, the study of intelligence and covert action in the Arab world 
and in the developing world more broadly is in its infancy. The subject should 
nonetheless be of interest to intelligence specialists, area specialists and students of 
authoritarian politics. If this article encourages that interest it will have served its 
purpose.  
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